The global dynamics are undergoing significant change. Once isolated, Saudi Arabia is becoming more and more prominent as established patterns break down. The Kingdom is brought to light due to its strategic location, abundant petrochemical reserves, and ambitious modernization plans. This raises significant concerns regarding Saudia’s influence on the developing global order and its effects on the Middle East.
Tracing the narrative of Saudi Arabia’s transformation demands acknowledging its historical weight. Long a pivotal player in global energy markets and custodian of Islam’s holiest sites, the Kingdom has navigated internal reforms, regional instability, and the volatile tides of oil economics. However, a deliberate and multifaceted metamorphosis has taken hold in recent years.
Vision 2030, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s audacious diversification roadmap, aims to reshape the Saudi economy, foster social progress, and propel the nation onto the global stage as a technological and cultural hub.
This growing aspiration aligns with a world in transition. The assertiveness of regional actors and the ascent of nations such as China threaten the established Western hegemony. Climate change and technological changes intensify the problem, necessitating creative thinking and flexible leadership. Saudi Arabia’s rich strategic resources, ability to maneuver in geopolitics, and growing assertiveness in diplomacy position it as a possible game-changer in this changing world.
Background
Following the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, the leading Arab powers emerged as Egypt, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, forming a trilateral regional order. That structure collapsed in 2011 with the Arab Spring, posing fresh challenges to Saudi Arabia.
For instance, demonstrators overthrew its most ardent friend, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Protests demanding broad political reforms that challenged the ruling class throughout the Arab world extended to Syria, Bahrain, and other Arab nations.
Following the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia’s foreign policy took a different turn, portraying Riyadh as pursuing assertive regional actions. Nevertheless, since 2020, the direction of this policy has shifted.
In 2019, Iranian drones attacked the Abqaiq Aramco oil refinery. The Trump administration declined to retaliate or hold Iran accountable for its aggression. Due to Washington’s reluctance over the past three years, Riyadh’s leadership has changed its approach to foreign policy (Qaed, 2023).
Its recent initiatives towards foreign policy, which range from resolving regional disputes to developing stronger relationships with Asian superpowers, show that it is now willing to step outside of its comfort zone.
On the home front, loosening social constraints and advocating women’s emancipation represents a profound societal change. This convergence of opportunities from the outside world and internal change will test the real reach of Saudi Arabia’s influence. It is therefore necessary to look at the Kingdom’s course.
Evolving Foreign Policy
The U.S. protected Saudia’s security needs in exchange for oil. Apart from the 1973–1974 oil embargo and the September 11, 2001 terror attacks, the seven-decade relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia has fairly been cordial and cooperative.
However, with the turning events on the global stage like the Russia-Ukraine war, the trade-off between oil and security that kept the partnership afloat has collapsed as Washington has weaned itself from Saudi hydrocarbons and Riyadh has begun to question U.S. commitment to Saudi security.
Saudi Arabia is still seeking various forms of collaboration and support from the United States under Mohammed bin Salman. Still, it believes these can coexist with stronger security, diplomatic, and economic links with China, Russia, and other nations (S. Chivvis et al., 2023).
Role in the Ukraine Crisis
Saudi Arabia views itself as a significant player in a position to facilitate talks aimed at putting an end to the conflict in Ukraine. A two-day peace summit on Ukraine was held in August 2023 in Riyadh and attended by dignitaries from over forty nations.
Russia claimed that the gathering was a “futile, doomed effort” by the West to rally support for Ukraine in the Global South, and it boycotted it. Nonetheless, Saudi Arabia saw the summit as a fruitful demonstration of its diplomatic aspirations outside its conventional sphere of influence.
Additionally, it has volunteered to mediate talks. In September 2022, it assisted Türkiye in arranging a significant prisoner exchange between Russia and Ukraine involving nearly 300 individuals (Ogirenko & Yaakoubi, 2022).
U.S. President Joe Biden warned that Riyadh’s decision to reduce oil production in collaboration with Moscow would have actual “consequences” for the Kingdom. Even though the U.S. has lessened its reliance on Saudi oil, Washington still considered these cuts a hostile act—not least because they gave Russia income in defiance of Western sanctions. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has consistently refuted claims that the cuts were motivated by politics.
The New Leadership
The young and dynamic leadership of Mohammad Bin Salman, who has been the Crown Prince since 2017, is changing it all. The Kingdom is moving away from the bloc politics of the U.S. towards a more neutral, harmonious, and zero-enemy policy, especially regarding the rising significant powers in Asia, including China, Russia, and India.
This is evident through Saudia’s active neutrality regarding the Ukraine war and increasing ties with China. China has been the Kingdom’s principal trading partner and source of crude oil imports since 2011. These days, the two emerging nations are deepening their relationship beyond commerce.
During a visit that China hailed as “an epoch-making milestone in the history of the development of China-Arab relations” (El Yaakoubi & Baptisa, 2022), Riyadh and Beijing elevated their connection to a comprehensive strategic partnership in 2022.
Where U.S-Saudi relations are based on security ties, Beijing’s connection to Riyadh is based on commerce and economics (Qaed, 2023).
The CEO of Saudi Aramco, a state-owned enterprise, has reaffirmed Saudi Arabia’s commitment to supplying China with energy for at least the next 50 years. There is plenty of opportunity for more cooperation in the upcoming decades, as China intends to get 80% of its energy from non-fossil fuel sources by 2060, and Saudi Arabia aims to become the world’s leading producer of hydrogen.
From an oil-based, tight tie, Saudi-China relations are evolving into a more expansive alliance that includes infrastructure development and the transfer of cutting-edge technologies. Leaders in Saudi Arabia think that Chinese capital and experience can assist them in diversifying their economy away from hydrocarbons.
Reconciliatory Efforts in the Region and Saudi-Iran Rapprochement
The Kingdom’s new strategy on the international stage includes efforts to maintain long-standing alliances while fostering fresh ties with China and Russia. To improve the region’s security environment, the Saudis have been actively involved in efforts at reconciliation with states across the region.
The Al Ula Agreement, which ended the four-year blockade against Qatar in 2021, marked the beginning of this policy. Iraq and Oman tried to arbitrate between the two nations, while the Saudis tried to contain Iran through engagement.
Two main reasons drive the Saudi-Iran rivalry. Firstly, the Saudis follow the Sunni-Wahabi sect of Islam, while Iran’s regime, on the other hand, practices Shia Islam. This rivalry between Sunni and Shia Islam dates back to the time of Prophet Muhammad’s death and the succession struggle for the Muslim Caliphate.
The second reason is their ongoing struggle for “Regional Supremacy.” The two countries have been on the opposite poles in nearly every conflict in the Middle East. This is apparent through Saudia’s historic alliance with the U.S. and the capitalist bloc and Iran’s with Russia and communists, which led to a standoff resembling a cold war in the hot desert. In a nutshell, Saudi Arabia was facing numerous challenges because of its friction with Iran (Why the Saudis Will Win the 2030s, 2023).
Saudi-China Relations
China has increased its involvement in the Middle East; in March 2023, it played a significant role in mediating a conciliation between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The current warming of relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran can potentially reduce tensions in the area that have been simmering for some time.
Beijing was a friend to both parties and did not carry any bad political baggage in the region. Hence, Beijing’s delayed intervention was vital to accomplish the accord. China is Saudi Arabia’s most significant economic partner but has a tight relationship with Iran. Iran may be persuaded or coerced to follow the reconciliation by using this economic leverage (Qaed, 2023).
Also Read: Pakistan-Russia Diplomatic Bond
The reintegration of Syria into the Arab League earlier this year only became possible because Saudi Arabia changed its position. Even though a few Arab nations—Qatar, Kuwait, and Morocco, have not restored diplomatic ties with Damascus and continue to believe that al-Assad’s government is unconstitutional, Riyadh used its clout as an influential figure in the Arab and Islamic worlds to convince these nations to stop standing in the way of Syria’s admission to the Arab League.
Damascus believes that resuming formal relations with Saudi Arabia and other wealthy Arab countries could eventually provide the financial assistance and legitimacy that Syria’s government needs (Milliken, 2023).
Saudi-Israel Relations
A turning point in the geopolitical dynamics of the region was reached when Saudi Arabia decided to engage with Israel, leading to the Abraham Accords. Although slow-moving and cautious, this change demonstrates Saudi Arabia’s recognition of the changing geopolitical environment and its prioritization of national interests within the framework of “zero enemies.”
To analyze this development, we must consider two key events: the Abraham Accords and the recent Hamas-Israel conflict in October 2023.
The 2020 signing of the Abraham Accords marks an essential first step toward Israel and numerous Arab governments, including the UAE, obtaining normalized relations. Saudi Arabia was not formally a part of the deal, but its implicit backing and unspoken endorsement were vital to its success.
Saudi Arabia has recognized the potential advantages of stronger economic and security connections with Israel, especially in areas like technology advancement and counterterrorism, and this is shown in their pragmatic attitude.
Effect of Hamas-Israel War
However, the latest confrontation between Israel and Hamas brought to light the nuanced facts that underlie any possible reconciliation. Many speculate that Hamas perfected the attack’s timing to halt the normalization process between both countries (Alrebh, 2023). As a sign of its ongoing support for the Palestinian cause, Saudi Arabia openly denounced the bloodshed in Gaza.
This delicate balancing exercise indicates the Kingdom’s wish to manage its geopolitical calculations without endangering its long-standing position as an advocate for Palestinian rights. The road to complete normalization in the future is yet undetermined.
Significant obstacles are presented by Saudi Arabia’s internal sensitivities, majorly being the custodian of Islam’s holiest sites and hence viewed as the leader of Muslim Ummah and Brotherhood- and the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict. However, one should not undervalue the possibility of additional cooperation on shared security issues, regional economic projects, and even cross-cultural interactions.
Saudi-UAE Investment in Iraq
The recent $6 billion combined investment made in Iraq by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) represents a dramatic shift in the political and economic landscape of the Middle East. The announcement of this strategic move in July 2023 promises to change the region’s dynamics while supporting Iraq’s economy.
Saudi Arabia and UAE allocated six Billion Dollars for investment in the renewable energy sectors like solar and hydrogen energy of Iraq. Iraq wanted aid by depositing dollars in its central bank to stabilize its economy, but Saudia and UAE saw it as an investment opportunity.
As announced by the Saudi Finance Minister, the Kingdom will no longer provide free and unconditional economic support to the crushing economies. Saudi Aramco and Abu Dhabi National Oil Company are aiming for long-term contracts in the country to play their role in fulfilling the energy needs and view Iraq as a potential new market with a large population but energy shortages despite having huge oil reserves (BIG: Saudi Arabia, UAE BIG Investment Plans for Iraq – Iran Joins the Party, 2023).
This might result in the development of jobs, better infrastructure, and a diversification of the Iraqi economy away from its reliance on oil. Economic stability facilitates political stability, which may lessen societal unrest and fortify Iraq’s central government.
Challenges to the Project
The united effort by the UAE and Saudi Arabia represents a thawing of tensions that had recently existed between the two countries on political and religious issues. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) bloc is strengthened by this diplomatic thaw, fostering regional solidarity and uniting the region in opposition to possible external threats. This advancement does, however, also bring some potential difficulties.
Iran, a significant player in Iraqi politics for a long time, sharing the commonalities of the Shia majority population, would be suspicious of the growing Saudi-UAE dominance, which might cause tensions in the region to rise. In addition, there are still unanswered concerns regarding the distribution and allocation of cash inside Iraq, including ensuring fairness and openness to prevent escalating internal tensions.
Saudi Vision 2030
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s ambitious plan, Vision 2030, aims to move the Kingdom from relying on hydrocarbons to a diverse, knowledge-based economy. We can recognize the transformative ambition and possible difficulties entailed in this audacious endeavor by closely examining certain essential features of the Vision.
The switch from geopolitics to geo-economics is one of Vision 2030’s fundamental changes. The Kingdom wants to foster a thriving economic ecosystem promoting cooperation and collaboration because it understands the drawbacks of engaging in regional conflicts.
This is demonstrated by programs like the Public Investment Fund (PIF), a sovereign wealth fund with over $800 billion in assets carefully allocated to high-growth industries like clean energy, robots, and artificial intelligence.
Furthermore, NEOM, the futuristic megacity meant to serve as a center of sustainability and innovation, represents this economic diversity. With a $500 billion GDP predicted by 2045, NEOM hopes to draw in firms and talent worldwide while promoting innovative research and development in materials science and biotechnology (Vision 2030, 2023).
The Kingdom is actively seeking alternative trade and investment partnerships to increase its presence in Asia and Africa. In 2019, initiatives such as the “Saudi Aramco IPO” raised a record $25.6 billion, attracting foreign capital and expanding the investment environment.
Saudi Arabia wants to be less dependent on the petrodollar to have more economic independence and maneuverability when negotiating changes in international exchange rates. The Kingdom was also in talks with China to trade in local currencies.
Promoting Sports and Tourism
Vision 2030 acknowledges the ability of soft power to change the Kingdom’s perception worldwide. A more extensive “sportswashing” campaign includes the recent purchase of Newcastle United, a football team in the English Premier League, of which Cristiano Ronaldo’s signing is one prominent example for Al-Nassar Club.
Saudi Arabia seeks to enhance its cultural outreach and reputation by drawing visitors and international investment by investing in and promoting the entertainment and leisure sectors.
Similar to this, large-scale initiatives like the luxury islands and Red Sea megacity, for example, Amaala and Shebara, seek to establish the Kingdom as a top tourist destination competing with cities like Dubai, further diversifying its economy and generating new job possibilities (The Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, n.d.).
Future Outlook
Saudi Arabia joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation as a dialogue partner in March 2023. As of January 2024, Saudi Arabia has officially joined BRICS. They have shown interest in joining the BRICS group because they believe it will be essential to attaining their Vision 2030.
Strengthening business connections with China, India, and Brazil—three of the world’s largest oil consumers—will yield substantial short-term benefits. Joining the world’s fastest-growing economies will open up trade and investment opportunities in non-energy exports and provide Riyadh access to cutting-edge knowledge and technology that will revolutionize its economy.
Similarly, the world is also looking forward to the newly announced India-Middle East Economic Corridor (IMEC) and how this will impact the Middle East’s regional connectivity and international relations.
Lastly, Washington observers point out that the United States’ supposed principal ally in the Middle East does not behave like a partner. However, a new element has emerged with the Israel-Hamas conflict and Yemeni Houthis in the Red Sea.
Both the Biden administration and Saudi Arabia have a substantial stake in Israel’s normalization process. This has not stopped, but the war has slowed it down. Washington may look to Riyadh to be crucial to the post-conflict landscape.
Conclusion
To conclude, the Kingdom’s cautious but relentless gestures towards engagement with Israel reflect a pragmatic calculation of its national interests and a commitment to a more peaceful and prosperous future for the entire region, even though the future of Saudi-Israeli relations is still uncertain.
The geopolitical environment of the Middle East may change in the years to come if this continuing process is handled sensitively and with a dedication to regional stability. The challenges to the Vision include right-wing groups in society opposing internal reforms prioritizing women’s empowerment and social change.
Megaprojects like NEOM continue to raise concerns about their viability, especially in light of shifting oil prices and other environmental issues. Furthermore, ongoing worries about political freedoms cloud the Kingdom’s hopes for greater international involvement.
With Saudi Arabia hosting the 2030 World Expo and 2034 FIFA World Cup, one wonders how different Saudi Arabia will be by then. How many of the planned goals and ambitions would have been achieved? How diversified will the economy be? Increasingly, the answer to these questions will be decided and delivered by the leadership of Saudi Arabia, reminding us that individuals with Vision often drive the change causing the shifts in the global order.
References
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El Yaakoubi, A., & Baptisa, E. (2022, December 7). China’s Xi on “Epoch-Making” Visit to Saudi as Riyadh Chafes at US Censure. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/chinas-xi-starts-epoch-making-saudi-visit-deepen-economic-strategic-ties-2022-12-07/
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Ogirenko, V., & Yaakoubi, A. E. (2022, September 22). Russia, Ukraine announce major surprise prisoner swap. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-releases-10-foreigners-captured-ukraine-after-saudi-mediation-riyadh-2022-09-21/
Qaed, A. A. (2023, May 10). From Confrontational to Subtle Diplomacy: The Reorientation of Saudi Foreign Policy. Gulf International Forum. https://gulfif.org/from-confrontational-to-subtle-diplomacy-the-reorientation-of-saudi-foreign-policy/
Chivvis, C., Miller, A. D., & Breiner, B. G. (2023, November). Saudi Arabia in the Emerging World Order. Carnegie. https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/11/06/saudi-arabia-in-emerging-world-order-pub-90819
The Embassy of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. (n.d.). Vision 2030 | The Embassy of The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Www.saudiembassy.net. https://www.saudiembassy.net/vision-2030
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Why the Saudis will Win the 2030s. (2023, December 13). Www.youtube.com. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sISTcOjHiLY&ab_channel=AaronWatsonBusiness
I am currently pursuing a Bachelor’s degree in International Relations. My areas of interest include Current Affairs, Diplomacy and International Political Economy.
